

Secret	

Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective

25X1

A Research Paper

DIA review completed.

State Dept. review completed

Secret

GI 82-10299 January 1982

^{Copy} 559





Secret		

Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective

25X1

A Research Paper

Information available as of 31 December 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report.

This paper was prepared by analysts in the Near East—South Asia Branch, Geography Division, Office of Global Issues, with contributions from the Office of Near East—South Asia Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Near East—South Asia Branch, OGI

This paper was coordinated with the Office of Near East—South Asia Analysis and with the National Intelligence

Officer for the Near East and South Asia.


25X1

25X1

Secret GI 82-10299 January 1982 Secret

25X1

Figure 1
Golan Heights



Approved	For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP83B00851R00040015000	2-5
	Secre	t
		25X1
	Syria-Israel: The Golan Heights in Perspective	25 X 1
·		25 X 1
Overview	Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights on 14 culminated a steady tightening of control over the region from Syria in 1967 (figure 1). Well before the annexation Syrians who had not fled during the fighting had been ex Syrian villages had been razed, the Israeli curriculum was even in the few remaining Arab schools, and 31 Jewish s been established and transferred from military to civilian	it had captured i, most of the kpelled, many 25X6 as being taught ettlements had
	Historically, the Golan Heights had never been a part of state, and the region had not contained a significant Jewi 3,000 years. The Ottoman Empire, the last of a millenium of Muslim rulers, governed the area until the end of Wor France assumed control of it as part of the League of Nat Syria, while Britain assumed control of the neighboring Malestine. In 1922 the two countries established an intern	sh population for n-long succession ld War I. Then ions Mandate for Mandate for

In 1946, the French Mandate was divided and Syria gained its independence. In 1948, when Britain withdrew from Palestine, Syria and four other Arab states attacked the new state of Israel as it fought to establish its borders within Palestine. The Armistice Agreement signed in 1949 left Syria in control of three small regions in northern Israel. Although they were

iii

between their Mandates.

Secret GI 82-10299 January 1982

Secret		
		25 X 1
	demilitarized, competition and conflict over the three regions gradually	•
	escalated and in 1967 provided Israel with its primary justification for	
	invading Syria following its successful attacks on Egypt and Jordan. By the	
	time a cease-fire was arranged, Israel was in control of two-thirds of	
	Syria's agriculturally prosperous westernmost Province of Al Qunaytirah;	0EV4
	it subsequently renamed the region the Golan Heights.	25 X 1
	In 1973 Syrian forces attacked Israel and temporarily reoccupied about	
	half of the Golan Heights before they were repulsed, and agreed to a new	
	cease-fire line and buffer zone. The 1973 Middle East war proved to be only a temporary interruption in the gradual "Israelization" of the Golan	
	Heights.	05)/4
	Heights.	25 X 1
	More than 100,000 Syrian Arabs fled or were expelled from the area	
	during and after the 1967 fighting. An Israeli census taken soon after the	
	war counted only 6,400 Syrian nationals on the Golan, most of them Druze	
	farmers living in a few villages in the north. Since then the Arab	
	population of these villages has grown to about 14,000. Meanwhile, the	
	Syrian imprint on the remainder of the Golan has been all but destroyed.	
		25X1
	G' 1067 6 000 Israelie have cettled 21 new Galan communities	20/(1
	Since 1967 some 6,000 Israelis have settled 31 new Golan communities, including Katzrin, the administrative and commercial center where the	
	Israelis plan to house 20,000 citizens. Agriculture—grain, vegetables, fruit,	
	and livestock—is the predominant activity. Although the Israeli settle-	
	ments on the Golan have increased steadily in size and number, progress	
	has been slower than planned, owing to a shortage of funds and a dearth of	
	willing settlers. They nonetheless exist as "facts" created by Israel to	
	strengthen its hold on the occupied Golan.	25 X 1
		23/1
	According to the terms of the disengagement agreement signed in 1974, Is-	
	raeli and Syrian military forces are separated by a buffer zone at the	
	eastern margin of the Golan Heights, which is manned by the UN	
	Disengagement Observer Force. Each country may maintain only limited	
	forces and weaponry within specified distances of the buffer zone. Although force and weapon levels have varied considerably, both sides have	
	generally adhered to the terms of the agreement with neither side normally	
	maintaining as large a military presence as the agreement permits. Even	
	during the Israeli military buildup on the Golan beginning in December,	
	the Israelis apparently did not exceed the authorized levels. Syria limited	
	its reaction to diplomatic efforts.	
	-	25 X 1

Secret		

Contents

Overview Evolution of Control Over the Golan	
Evolution of Control Over the Golan	iii
	1
The 1922 International Boundary	1
The 1948 War and 1949 Armistice Lines	2
The 1967 War and Cease-Fire Lines	4
The 1973 War	4
The 1974 Disengagement Agreement	6
The Golan Heights as Part of Syria	6
The Golan Heights Under Israel	9
The Golan Druze	9
Israeli Settlements	11
Water Resources	13
Transportation System	16
Figures	
1. Golan Heights	ii 3
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan 	3
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 	3 3
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 	3 3 3
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma 	3 3 3 4
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley 	3 3 3 4 5
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights 	3 3 3 4 5 6
 Golan Heights Palestine Partition Plan Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 	3 3 3 4 5 6 6
 Golan Heights 2-A. Palestine Partition Plan 2-B. Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 2-C. Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 1967 Cease-Fir Lines 	3 3 3 4 5 6 6 7
1. Golan Heights 2-A. Palestine Partition Plan 2-B. Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 2-C. Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 3. Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma 4. Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley 5. Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights 6. Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 7. 1967 Cease-Fir Lines 8. Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines	3 3 3 4 5 6 6 7 8
1. Golan Heights 2-A. Palestine Partition Plan 2-B. Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 2-C. Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 3. Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma 4. Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley 5. Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights 6. Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 7. 1967 Cease-Fir⊕ Lines 8. Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines 9. Al Qunaytirah	3 3 3 4 5 6 6 7 8
1. Golan Heights 2-A. Palestine Partition Plan 2-B. Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 2-C. Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 3. Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma 4. Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley 5. Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights 6. Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 7. 1967 Cease-Fir Lines 8. Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines	3 3 3 4 5 6 6 7 8
1. Golan Heights 2-A. Palestine Partition Plan 2-B. Palestine-Syria Boundary, 1922 2-C. Israel-Syria Boundary, 1949 3. Former Arab Resort of Al Hamma 4. Terrain Profiles: Golan Heights and Upper Jordan Valley 5. Hula Valley Viewed From Golan Heights 6. Golan Heights Viewed From Israel 7. 1967 Cease-Fir⊕ Lines 8. Current Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Lines 9. Al Qunaytirah	3 3 3 4 5 6 6 7 8

Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP83B00851R000400150002-5

Secret		

25X1

Tables

- 1	1.	Non-Jewish Population of the Golan Heights After the 1967 War	11
	-		

25X6 25X1

Appendixes

Α.	Chronology of Events Affecting the Golan's Inhabitants	19
В.	Convention between Great Britain and France for the settlement of certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia—Paris, December 23, 1920	21
C.	Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, 20 July 1949	27
D.	United Nations. Security Council Resolutions No. 234 of 7 June 1967 and No. 235 of 9 June 1967 (Demarcation of cease-fire lines reported separately in Document 5/7930/add.18-41)	35
E.	United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967	37
F.	United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 338 of 22 October 1973	39
G.	Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, Israel and Syria, 31 May 1974	41
Н.	Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978	43

Syria-Israel:	
The Golan Heights in Perspective	

25X1

The Golan Heights has long held a special security significance in Israel's view. Israeli political leaders and the general public remember well the period before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when Syrian artillery on the Golan sporadically shelled Israeli farms and civilian communities in the disputed demilitarized zones in the Hula Valley. The scheduled final withdrawal from the Sinai next April, moreover, has generated new anxiety about increased vulnerability to the perceived Arab threat. This concern—plus longstanding suspicions of Syrian intentions—has further reinforced the Israelis' attachment to the Golan.

Indeed, Knesset passage on 14 December of Prime Minister Begin's bill effectively annexing the Golan Heights culminates a steady tightening of Israeli control over the territory. In 1979 the Israelis established a Golan regional council controlled by the Interior Ministry. A year later, the Knesset authorized the Interior Ministry to confer Israeli citizenship on amenable Golan Druze. Most major Israeli parties, moreover, have long sponsored settlements in the territory-a connection that has assured the settlers a formidable lobby within the government and Knesset. Public opinion polls in recent years showed consistently that an overwhelming majority favored eventual annexation. The timing and tactics used in passing the recent bill have sparked ineffective criticism by the opposition, which staged an unsuccessful no-confidence vote shortly after the 14 December annexation move.

Control of the Golan Heights gives the Israelis a buffer zone beyond its borders within which to contain a possible Syrian invasion. From their positions on the lower slopes of Mount Hermon, which dominates the local landscape, the Israelis can monitor not only the movements of Syrian units near the Golan but those of Palestinian guerrillas in southern Lebanon as well. Control of the northern Golan, moreover, ensures Israeli control over the headwaters of the Baniyas River, a tributary of the upper Jordan River.

Evolution of Control Over the Golan

The territory now known as the Golan Heights is a tiny part of the "fertile crescent," the ancient pathway around the deserts of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq that has been a route of trade, migration, invasion, and shifting political control throughout recorded time. Although this particular area was never a part of a centralized Jewish state in the modern sense, ruins of Jewish synagogues on the Heights are continuing evidence of Jewish settlement there during the Second and Third Centuries A.D. Following the fall of Jerusalem to the Romans in 70 A.D. and the subsequent Jewish dispersion, the entire region eventually came under the control of the Byzantines and later of a series of Muslim powers—periodically interrupted by Crusaders, the ruins of whose castles still dot the area. The Ottoman Empire (1517-1917), the last of the Muslim sovereigns over the area, ended with World War I. Near the end of Ottoman rule, several Jewish philanthropists bought land in various areas of the Middle East for the resettlement of Jews from Europe and Russia. Although most of these purchases were in Palestine, two such resettlement communities were 25X1 attempted on the Golan Heights.

The 1922 International Boundary. During World War I, the British, French, and Italians encouraged the Arabs to revolt against Turkish rule by promising them independence. After the war, however, the Allies reneged on their promise and divided up the territory into Mandates under the League of Nations.

25X1

The boundary between the British Mandate for Palestine (out of which Israel was carved) and the French Mandate for Syria (which included the Golan Heights and present-day Lebanon) was demarcated by an Anglo-French boundary commission in 1922 and formally accepted by those governments in March 1923 (appendix B and figure 2-B). The boundary is about 65 kilometers long and extends from the current Lebanon-Syria-Israel tripoint to the present Jordan border (then British Transjordan).

25X1


Secret

25X1

25X1



Figure 2



Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1




Figure 3. Former Arab resort town of Al Hamma on Nahr al Yarmuk River, 1979.

one and that only the United Nations had the authority to settle disputes arising in and over the zones. The Syrians reasoned that since they had controlled the zones at the time the armistice was signed they had an obligation to protect the rights of Palestinian Arabs living there. The Israelis contended the zones were part of their territory based on the UN Partition Plan. The Israelis claimed that the only limit on their authority in the demilitarized zones was the prohibition on troops and military activity and that the chairman of a Mixed Armistice Committee appointed by the United Nations had authority only over the return of civilians to the zones and the hiring of local residents as police.

The Armistice Agreement directed that farming in the demilitarized zones be quickly restored to prehostility levels but gave no guidance on how the land was to be returned to its owners. The problem was complex because the fields of Arab and Jewish farmers often abutted and in some places were intermingled. Both Syria and Israel used the expansion of agricultural holdings as a means to establish control. As farmers returned to the war-ravaged zones, numerous disputes over land ownership occurred. The Syrians and Israelis had established defensive positions on the Golan Heights and in the Galilee Hills from which flat trajectory fire could be delivered to the zones on the valley floor (figures 4, 5, and 6). Despite UN willingness to arbitrate, the governents tended to

back their own participants in local disputes, and disagreements quickly escalated to shootings—and on occasion to more serious military actions involving armored vehicles and artillery.


The 1967 War and Cease-Fire Lines. By early 1967 artillery exchanges and even airstrikes were occurring fairly regularly. The climax came on 9 June 1967 when Israel invaded Syria following its earlier attacks on Egypt and Jordan. Israeli forces captured the demilitarized zones and penetrated about 25 kilometers into Syria, occupying about two-thirds of the Syrian Province of Al Qunaytirah. In response to a UN Security Council demand, a cease-fire was implemented on 10 June. During the next several days the line that marked the limit of advance of the Israeli forces was demarcated by UN observers. A buffer zone ranging in width from a few hundred meters to 2.5 kilometers was established east of this line (appendixes D and E, figure 7).


Israel officially named the region it occupied the Golan Heights. The name Golan is derived from the name of a city of refugees in Bashan, as the region was known in Biblical times. Sometimes, the Israelis still refer to the region as Bashan.


The Golan Heights remained relatively quiet between 1967 and October 1973. In part this was due to the Israeli policy of not allowing the return of the approximately 100,000 refugees who had fled or were expelled during and after the 1967 fighting. Beginning in 1968, the Israelis began establishing farm communities on the Golan; this violation of international law drew widespread international criticism and enraged the Syrians. Some of the new settlements were within 3 kilometers of the 1967 cease-fire line and in sight of Syrian Army positions. In effect, the Israelis had merely moved many contentious aspects of the Demilitarized Zone situation about 25 kilometers to the east.


The 1973 War. On 6 October 1973, in coordination with Egyptian attacks on the Sinai, Syrian forces launched a surprise attack on Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and penetrated the center of the Israeli

Secret









line, passing to the south of Al Qunaytirah and isolating several pockets of Israeli troops. By the morning of 7 October the southernmost Syrian elements had almost reached Al Al, about 10 kilometers east of Lake Tiberias, while in the north the penetration was shallower. The Israelis counterattacked on 7 October, and by 10 October the Syrian forces had retreated east of the 1967 cease-fire line except for units still holding a portion of Mount Hermon. By 14 October the Israeli forces had carved out a roughly semicircular area that stretched from the lower slopes

of Mount Hermon almost to Sasa, about midway between Al Qunaytirah and Damascus, and rejoined the cease-fire line southeast of Al Qunaytirah. For the next 10 days the Israelis directed most of their efforts toward holding the 600-square-kilometer semicircle, although they also recaptured their positions on Mount Hermon. Large-scale hostilities ended on 24 October, but hostile incidents, snipings, and occasional artillery exchanges continued during the winter and spring while US Secretary of State Kissinger practiced shuttle diplomacy.




Figure 5. The Hula Valley and Galilee Hills viewed in 1975 from a pre-1967 Syrian gun emplacement on the Golan Heights. Gadot, an Israeli kibbutz in the center of the photograph, is located in a demilitarized zone created by the 1949 armistice.

The 1974 Disengagement Agreement. A disengagement agreement was signed by Israel and Syria on 31 May 1974 (appendixes F and G). On 6 June Israeli and Arab forces began a staged withdrawal. Under the agreement, Israeli military forces pulled back to positions west of "Line A," which coincided with the 1967 cease-fire line except near Ar Rafid and Al Qunaytirah (figure 8). From just north of Al Qunaytirah Line A swings westward and then southeastward to rejoin the 1967 cease-fire line. An additional line termed "A-1" forms a bulge on Line A around Al Qunaytirah, in which Israeli civilians, but not military forces, are permitted.

All territory east of Line A is under Syrian administration and with the exception of Al Qunaytirah—which was largely destroyed after the cease-fire by withdrawing Israeli units (figures 9 and 10)—was gradually repopulated by Syrian civilians. Syrian forces are required to remain east of "Line B"; the area between Lines A and B is the zone of separation where the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF—strength about 1,250) is stationed to maintain the cease-fire. UNDOF also monitors the bulge between Lines A and A-1. East and west of Lines A and B are areas in which forces and armaments are limited as specified in the disengagement



Figure 6. Southern Golan Heights viewed from Galilee Hills west of Lake Tiberias, 1975.

25X1

25X1

25**X**1

agreement.

25X1

arrangement went into effect on 26 June 1974 and remains current, subject to renewal every six months (in May and November).

25**X**1

25X1


In addition, the need for Syria and Israel to negotiate the future of the Golan Heights and to conclude a peace treaty is specifically mentioned in the Camp David Accords (appendix H).


25X1


The Golan Heights as Part of Syria

Until 1967 the region now known as the Golan Heights formed about two-thirds of Al Qunaytirah Muhafazat, Syria's 13th province (figure 11). In 1965 Al Qunaytirah Province had an estimated population of 142,600 people, most living in small farming communities but about 30,000 living in Al Qunaytirah, a town in the center of the province. Most of the province residents were Muslim Arabs, predominantly Sunnites; minority groups included Druze, Alawites, Christian Arabs, and Sunni Muslim Circassians. In addition to the Syrian population, some 13,000 Palestinian refugees were housed in the town of Al Qunaytirah.

Figure 7







25X1



Figure 9. Downtown Al Qunaytirah, 1975. White markings on buildings indicated structures not to be destroyed by withdrawing Israeli units.

Although its 1,770 square kilometers accounted for only about 1 percent of the country's total land area, Al Qunaytirah was nevertheless one of Syria's most productive agricultural regions. According to 1965 land use statistics, 58 percent of the land was suitable for cultivation (some was actually in natural pasture), 16 percent consisted of scrub woodlands and orchards, 11 percent was in improved pasture, and the remainder was unsuited for any agricultural use. Most of the farmland lay between the towns of Fig and Al Ounaytirah; the orchards were located mainly in the north, although some tropical fruit trees were grown near Lake Tiberias. Although much of the pasture land was on the poorer, rocky slopes in the west, it still had the highest stock-carrying capacity in the country, about four times the national average. In 1965 Al Ounaytirah accounted for about 16 percent of Syria's corn production, 17 percent of its millet, and 7 percent of its fodder crops. Winter vegetables, especially tomatoes, were an important specialty crop. Fruit yields in the province were the highest in Syria; its output of apples, for example, accounted for a fourth of the country's total crop.

The Golan Heights Under Israel

During and after the 1967 fighting in the Golan Heights, much of the population—an estimated 100,000 Syrians and some 13,000 Palestinian refugees—fled or were expelled farther into Syria. An Israeli census conducted in September 1967 enumerated only 6,400 Syrian nationals—most of them Druze living in a few villages northeast of Al




Figure 10. Tall al Aram and razed Syrian housing viewed from Al Qunaytirah, 1975.

25X1

Qunaytirah. Since then, the population of these villages has more than doubled, but the Syrian population of the Golan Heights is still only a small fraction of its pre-1967 population (table 1 and figure 11).

Except for the aforementioned villages, the original Syrian settlement pattern on the Golan Heights has been largely obliterated. Since 1967 the Israelis have razed at least 80 of the 190 former villages and have destroyed other Syrian private property to make way for Israeli settlements, farms, fortifications, and military training areas. In many areas the Israelis have removed the stone fences and markers that outlined Syrian fields, making any future individual Syrian land ownership claims nearly impossible.

The Golan Druze. Why the Israelis allowed these few thousand Druze (and Alawites) to remain on the 25X1 Golan Heights is not known, but it is probably the result of a combination of circumstances. The Druze villages in the northern hills were outside the main battle areas; the communities were close knit, and determined not to abandon their rich farmlands; and the Israelis regard the Druze living in Israel as complaisant citizens who support the state—for example, by serving in the military.

The Alawite village of Al Gh	ajar also survived	because it was	
taken late in the war; Israel in	itially believed the	village was part of	οf
Lebanon.			

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



Table 1 Non-Jewish Population of the Golan Heights After the 1967 War

Syrian Settlements	Census 1967	Estimate 1981
Druze		
Majdal Shams	2,918	7,280
Buqata	1,425	3,080
Masadah	705	1,540
Ayn Qunyah	578	1,260
Shayta	173	(Destroyed in 1973 war)
Mansurah	6	(Razed by Israelis)
Alawite		
Al Ghajar	385	950
Mixed		
Al Qunaytirah	206	(In UNDOF zone after 1973)
Total	6,396	14,110

In any event, the residents of the five surviving villages still farm the lands they farmed before 1967. The 10,500 hectares under cultivation consist of extensive fruit orchards, vegetable gardens, grain fields, olive groves, and vineyards (figure 12). Additional land in pasture supports herds of sheep, goats, and cattle.

The Druze are neither united nor consistent in their political loyalties. Some express a desire to belong to an independent Druze state by flying the Druze flag. Others favor Israeli annexation, and still others want the return of Syrian sovereignty. Even family members disagree. Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih, the current leader of the Golan Druze, has provided inconsistent guidance. In 1974 he formally requested Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. Later, he evidently changed his mind, for he was among the hundreds of Golan Druze who petitioned Prime Minister Begin not to be incorporated into the State of Israel. In 1980 some Golan Druze accepted Israeli identity cards (conferring upon the holders some of the privileges of citizenship) only to turn them in a few months later under pressure from their religious




Figure 12. Druze village of Ayn Qunyah with Mount Hermon in background, 1973.

authorities. Some of these Druze have apparently welcomed the new Israeli law, for it requires them to have Israeli identity cards. Others still claim, however, "I am a Druze by religion, an Arab by nationality, Syria is my homeland, and I prefer to remain Syrian."

25X6

25X1



A number of organizations are cooperating in the development of the Golan Heights. The Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) is the primary planner but coordinates closely with the Israeli Government and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an international fundraising group. The JNF is responsible for preparing land for Israeli farming; various other ministries and agencies in the Israeli Government provide support. All major political parties sponsor settlements on the Golan Heights.

The WZO establishes settlement goals and sets up general budget requirements based on four-year cycles. More definitive plans are made yearly through the budgets of individual Israeli Government ministries. The budget of the WZO is implemented through the Ministry of Agriculture, while the government's own plans are funded mainly through the ministries concerned with housing, commerce, communications, and defense. Additional funds come from other ministries that handle education, health, religion, and immigrant absorptions. According to one WZO official, settlement activities for all the occupied territories generally amount to about 3 percent of the national budget. (This percentage is likely to rise appreciably to cover the special compensation due to the settlers who are required to evacuate the Sinai by April 1982.)

Since Prime Minister Begin's election in 1977, Golan Heights settlement activities have slowed because funds initially earmarked for this area have been diverted to the accelerated West Bank settlement program. As the 1978-81 WZO planning cycle ends, five of the eight planned new settlements have been established, and the settler population has grown to an estimated 6,500 (vice the 10,500 planned). Many of the new Golan communities contain vacant housing units, but there is no current evidence that large numbers of Israelis are likely soon to move to the area. Nevertheless, the 14 December annexation might eventually spur some increased settlement, especially after Israel's final withdrawal from the Sinai next April.

Israeli Agriculture. All but a few of the 31 Israeli settlements are at least partly engaged in farming. In 1975 some 5,600 hectares (including field crops, orchards, and vineyards) were being cultivated by the

Israelis; in addition, about 4,000 hectares (mainly along the rocky, western slopes) were being used for grazing. In 1977 the WZO claimed that almost 6,800 hectares were being farmed and that the total would reach nearly 12,000 hectares by 1981. According to 1981 data, however, this goal—like earlier ones—was not met; a reported 6,000 to 7,000 hectares are under cultivation in field crops and orchards. If pasture lands are added, the total area being used by the Israelis for farming amounts to more than 10,000 hectares.

El Rom and Ramat Magshimim are typical of the older Israeli agricultural settlements. El Rom, in the northern Golan, uses 290 hectares to grow wheat, apples, and avocadoes and to raise fish; in addition, it uses more than 1,700 hectares of land in the southern Golan for pasturage. Ramat Magshimim has some 450 hectares in wheat, 45 hectares in apple orchards, and 2,500 hectares in grazing land for 1,000 head of cattle.

Israeli agriculture is more intensive than that practiced earlier by the Syrians. Irrigation is widespread, even on some of the large wheat fields, and is expected to expand as new land is brought under cultivation. Data on total agricultural production from the Golan is not available to allow comparisons with former Syrian output or to determine the area's contribution to Israel's total crop and livestock production. In any event, the production is of little consequence to the national economy.

Water Resources. Although water resources on the Golan Heights were generally adequate for the area's Syrian population before June 1967, the Israelis are developing an expanded water distribution system designed to support irrigated agriculture (figure 11). When completed, the new system will supply a total of 28 million cubic meters of water annually. Because this amount is not available on the Golan Heights, water is drawn from two taps in Lake Tiberias and pumped up some 600 meters through three 16-inch pipes to a system of water towers and tanks located at settlements and military facilities in the southern Golan. Birkat Ram, a natural lake in the northern Golan, has also been tapped to supply water to the settlement blocs west and north of Al Qunaytirah and to some of the Druze villages.


25X1

Secret

25X1

25X1

Figure 13
Water Development Schemes on the Jordan River



Importance of the Golan to Israel's Water Supply. Israeli governments have repeatedly claimed that control of the Golan is critical to ensuring adequate supplies of water to their water-short country. To guarantee control over the upper Jordan River, however, the Israelis would have to occupy the river's entire watershed, including the part in southern Lebanon. Specifically, the Israelis want full access to two Jordan River tributaries, the Hasbani and the Baniyas, which together provide about half the river's flow.' (Jordan River water stored in Lake Tiberias provides about one-third—500 million cubic meters per year—of Israel's total water supply.)	divert water from the upper Jordan River, the Arab states threatened to divert major Jordan River tributaries. Lebanon proposed to divert the Hasbani into the Litani via a tunnel and canal; Syria proposed another conduit from the Hasbani, tapping its flow either at Al Mari or Al Ghajar. The Syrian canal would have intercepted the Baniyas River en route, to divert water southward across the Golan Heights to the Nahr al Yarmuk where it would tie in with the Jordanian irrigation systems. When the Lebanese and Syrians began actual work on these plans in 1964, Israel attacked the sites with artillery and aircraft, preventing further work.
The sources of the Hasbani River lie entirely within Lebanon (figure 13). From the village of Al Ghajar the Hasbani forms the former Syrian-Lebanon boundary for about 3 kilometers before entering Israel's Hula Valley, where it joins the Jordan River. The Baniyas River rises in the Golan on the western flank of Mount Hermon and flows for about 16 kilometers across the Golan Heights before entering Israel, where it also joins the Jordan in the Hula Valley.	Along the southern boundary of the Golan, Jordan developed a number of plans to divert waters from the Yarmuk. The East Ghor Canal, an underground diversion of the Yarmuk largely financed with US aid, was completed in 1966. Jordan also planned to 25X build two water storage dams farther upstream, including the Al Mukhaybah dam on which excavation work was halted when the Israelis occupied the Syrian side of the river during the 1967 war.
International disputes over control of the Jordan's headwaters preceded the formation of the Jewish state. Early Zionist planners tried unsuccessfully to get the British to demarcate Lebanon's southern frontier so as to place the Litani River within Palestine. Since then, proposals to divert the Litani southward to double the Jordan's flow have been a recurrent theme within Israel and a source of apprehension to Lebanon. In the 1950s Israel and its northern neighbors failed to negotiate a treaty to establish water rights in the Jordan watershed. In the absence of any agreement or international legal restraint, Israel and the Arab states forged ahead with their separate plans. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Israel began plans to The Dan River contributes most of the rest. Although much of its water is ultimately derived from the snow and rain of Syria and Lebanon, the Dan originates in Israel from a spring near the Israeli town of Dan in the Hula Valley.	Initial Israeli planning for diversion of water from the upper Jordan to the south called for a canal beginning in the demilitarized zone along the Syrian border, but Syrian artillery fire prevented work in the area. As an alternative, the Israelis resorted to drawing water from Lake Tiberias. The National Water Carrier, as the system is known, was completed in 1964. The Israelis do not need to occupy the entire Golan Heights to physically control all significant Golan tributaries to the Jordan's waters; they could accomplish this by occupying only a small portion of the northwestern Golan that includes the area from Baniyas to Al Ghajar. Lake Tiberias, Israel's primary water reservoir, would remain completely under Israeli control even with a withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice Line or to the original boundary of the Palestine Mandate. 25X1

25X1

The Israelis are also constructing small reservoirs for supplemental irrigation and for possible industrial use. Existing catchments store at least 7 million cubic meters of water; more are planned. The Baniyas River (annual flow 100 million cubic meters) is not a direct source of water for the Golan settlements. No dams have been built, and the entire flow goes into the Jordan, which feeds Lake Tiberias.

Transportation System. Before June 1967 the Golan Heights was mainly a farming region with one relatively large market center, Al Qunaytirah, which was also the provincial capital. Consequently, most of the roads in the region led directly or indirectly to Al Qunaytirah, and the only major road led from there to Damascus, some 65 kilometers to the northeast.

The Israelis have significantly improved this Syrian road network. They have opened five paved, two-lane access routes to the Heights, using parts of the earlier system (figure 11). They have built a number of other new roads, including the tortuous, loose-surface security road along the Lebanese border and have upgraded some existing roads such as the single-lane paved road along the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPline).

The TAPline carries crude oil from Saudi Arabia's oilfields across the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to the Lebanese oil port and refinery town of Az Zahrani. It crosses the Golan Heights diagonally from a point just south of Ar Rafid to a point just south of Al Ghajar. Despite the two wars fought on the Golan Heights, the Israelis have never stopped the flow of oil through the pipeline—although on a couple of occasions the Saudis have, for reasons not related to the Arab-Israeli wars or to Israeli occupation of the Golan.


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret



Appendix A

A Chronology of Events Affecting Golan Residents

1967	Israel occupies Golan Heights; many residents flee; most of rest expelled.	
1967	Israeli census enumerates 6,400 Syrian nationals on Golan, mostly Druze.	
1968	Israeli school curriculum imposed on Syrian Golan villagers, a violation of international law governing occupied territories.	
1972	Shaykh Kamal Kanj, leader of the Golan Druze, sentenced to 23 years in Israeli prison for espionage.	
1974	Some 90 percent of the Golan Druze reported to be members of Histadrut (Israel's labor federation).	
May 1974	Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih, leader of the Golan Druze, asks for Israeli annexation of the area end confusion.	
September 1974	Israeli security forces arrest a number of Golan Druze, mostly from Majdal Shams, on suspicion of offenses against state security.	
February 1976	Majdal Shams and Buqata, the two largest Syrian Golan villages, linked to Israeli national power grid.	
March 1976	An Israeli Druze is appointed officer in charge of religious affairs in the Military Government on the Golan, succeeding an Israeli Jew.	
January 1977	A number of Druze are arrested by Israeli security forces on suspicion of hostile activity on behalf of Syria against Israel.	
March 1979	Israeli Rabbinical courts with full authority established on the Golan Heights.	
June 1979	Regional councils for Israeli settlements on the Golan established, transferring control of settlements from the Israeli military government for the occupied territory to Israeli civilian administration.	
January 1979	Shaykh Sulayman Kanj Abu Salih and hundreds of others petition Prime Minister Menachem Begin, asking not to be incorporated into the State of Israel.	
July 1980	Israeli Knesset passes a law authorizing Minister of the Interior to issue Israeli identity cards to resident of any territory under Israeli control who apply for them. The law is directed toward the predominately Druze population of the Golan. About 500 Druze reportedly receive identity cards.	
October 1981	Only 28 Syrian Golan villagers continue to hold Israeli identity cards, because Druze religious leadershi opposed to Israeli citizenship for Golan Druze.	
December 1981	Israeli Knesset passes a bill extending Israeli law, legislation, and administration to the Golan, in effection annexing Syrian territory.	
December 1981	Israeli Interior Ministry incorporates Golan Heights into its northern district for administration of taxe and services. Justice Minister establishes magistrate courts in Druze village of Masadah and in Jewish town of Katzrin.	

Appendix B

Convention between Great Britain and France for the settlement of certain points connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia—Paris, 23 December 1920.

THE British and French Governments, respectively represented by the Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, wishing to settle completely the problems raised by the attribution to Great Britain of the Mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia and by the attribution to France of the Mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, all three conferred by the Supreme Council at San Remo, have agreed on the following provisions:-

ART. I. The boundaries between the territories under the French Mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British Mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on

the other, are determined as follows:

On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former vilayets of Diarbekir and Mosul.

On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former vilayets southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French Mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse, then a line to the south of Nasib on the Hedjaz Railway, then a line to Semakh on the Lake of

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

356

Tiberias, traced to the south of the railway, which descends towards the lake and parallel to the railway. Deraa and its environs will remain in the territory under the French Mandate; the frontier will in principle leave the valley of the Yarmuk in the territory under the French Mandate, but will be drawn as close as possible to the railway in such a manner as to allow the construction in the valley of the Yarmuk of a railway entirely situated in the territory under the British Mandate. At Semakh the frontier will be fixed in such a manner as to allow each of the two High Contracting Parties to construct and establish a harbour and railway station giving free access to the Lake of Tiberias.

On the west, the frontier will pass from Semakh across the Lake of Tiberias to the mouth of the Wadi Massadyie. It will then follow the course of this river upstream, and then the Wadi Jeraba to its source. From that point it will reach the track from El Kuneitra to Banias at the point marked Skek, thence it will follow the said track, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate as far as Banias. Thence the frontier will be drawn westwards as far as Metullah, which will remain in Palestinian territory. This portion of the frontier will be traced in detail in such a manner as to ensure for the territory under the French Mandate easy communication entirely within such territory with the regions of Tyre and Sidon, as well as continuity of road communicating to the west and to the east of Banias.

From Metullah the frontier will reach the watershed of the valley of the Jordan and the basin of the Litani. Thence it will follow this watershed southwards. Thereafter it will follow in principle the watershed between the Wadis Farah-Houroun and Kerkera, which will remain in the territory under the British Mandate, and the Wadis El Doubleh, El Aioun and Es Zerka, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate. The frontier will reach the Mediterranean Sea at the port of Ras-el-Nakura, which will remain in the territory under the French Mandate.

II. A Commission shall be established within three months from the signature of the present Convention to trace on the spot the boundary line laid down in Article I between the French and British Mandatory territories. This Commission shall be composed of four members. Two of these members shall be nominated by the British and French Governments respectively, the two others shall be nominated, with the consent of the Mandatory Power, by the local Governments concerned in the French and British Mandatory territories respectively.

In case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the Commission, the question shall be referred to

Secret

the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.

The final reports by the Commission shall give the definite description of the boundary as it has been actually demarcated on the ground; the necessary maps shall be annexed thereto and signed by the Commission. The reports, with their annexes, shall be made in triplicate; one copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one copy shall be kept by the Mandatory, and one by the other Government concerned.

III. The British and French Governments shall come to an agreement regarding the nomination of a Commission, whose duty it will be to make a preliminary examination of any plan of irrigation formed by the Government of the French Mandatory territory, the execution of which would be of a nature to diminish in any considerable degree the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates at the point where they enter the area of the British Mandate in Mesopotamia.

IV. In virtue of the geographic and strategic position of the island of Cyprus, off the Gulf of Alexandretta, the British Government agrees not to open any negotiations for the cession or alienation of the said island of Cyprus without the previous consent of the French Government.

V.—1. The French Government agrees to facilitate by a liberal arrangement the joint use of the section of the existing railway between the Lake of Tiberias and Nasib. arrangement shall be concluded between the railway Administrations of the areas under the French and British Mandates respectively as soon as possible after the coming into force of the Mandates for Palestine and Syria. In particular, the Agreement shall allow the Administration in the British zone to run their own trains with their own traction and train crews over the above section of the railway in both directions for all purposes other than the local traffic of the territory under the French Mandate. The agreement shall determine at the same time the financial, administrative and technical conditions governing the running of the British trains. In the event of the two Administrations being unable to reach an agreement within three months from the coming into force of the two above-mentioned Mandates, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to settle the points as to which a difference of opinion exists and immediate effect shall be given as far as possible to those parts of the Agreement on which an understanding has already been reached.

The said Agreement shall be concluded for an indefinite period and shall be subject to periodical revision as need arises.

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

2. The British Government may carry a pipe-line along the existing railway track and shall have in perpetuity and at any moment the right to transport troops by the railway.

3. The French Government consents to the nomination of a Special Commission, which, after having examined the ground, may re-adjust the above-mentioned frontier line in the valley of the Yarmuk as far as Nasib in such a manner as to render possible the construction of the British railway and pipe-line connecting Palestine with the Hedjaz Railway and the valley of the Euphrates, and running entirely within the limits of the areas under the British Mandate. It is agreed, however, that the existing railway in the Yarmuk Valley is to remain entirely in the territory under the French Mandate. The right provided by the present paragraph for the benefit of the British Government must be utilised within a maximum period of ten years.

The above-mentioned Commission shall be composed of a representative of the French Government and a representative of the British Government, to whom may be added representatives of the local Governments and experts as technical advisers to the extent considered necessary by the

British and French Governments.

358

4. In the event of the track of the British railway being compelled for technical reasons to enter in certain places the territory under French Mandate, the French Government will recognise the full and complete extra-territoriality of the sections thus lying in the territory under the French Mandate, and will give the British Government or its technical agents full and easy access for all railway purposes.

5. In the event of the British Government making use of the right mentioned in paragraph 3 to construct a railway in the valley of the Yarmuk, the obligations assumed by the French Government in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present article will determine three months after the

completion of the construction of the said railway.

6. The French Government agrees to arrange that the rights provided for above for the benefit of the British Government shall be recognised by the local Governments in the territory under the French Mandate.

VI. It is expressly stipulated that the facilities accorded to the British Government by the preceding articles imply the maintenance for the benefit of France of the provisions of the Franco-British Agreement* of San Remo regarding oil.

VII. The French and British Governments will put no obstacle in their respective Mandatory areas in the way of the recruitment of railway staff for any section of the Hedjaz Railway.

Page 350.

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

359

Every facility will be given for the passage of employees of the Hedjaz Railway over the British and French Mandatory areas in order that the working of the said railway

may be in no way prejudiced.

The French and British Governments agree, where necessary, and in eventual agreement with the local Governments, to conclude an arrangement whereby the stores and railway material passing from one Mandatory area to another and intended for the use of the Hedjaz Railway will not for this reason be submitted to any additional Customs dues and will be exempted so far as possible from Customs formalities.

VIII. Experts nominated respectively by the Administrations of Syria and Palestine shall examine in common within six months after the signature of the present Convention the employment, for the purposes of irrigation and the production of hydro-electric power, of the waters of the Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk and of their tributaries, after satisfaction of the needs of the territories under the French Mandate.

In connection with this examination, the French Government will give its representatives the most liberal instructions for the employment of the surplus of these waters for the benefit of Palestine.

In the event of no agreement being reached as a result of this examination, these questions shall be referred to the French and British Governments for decision.

To the extent to which the contemplated works are to benefit Palestine, the Administration of Palestine shall defray the expenses of the construction of all canals, weirs, dams, tunnels, pipe-lines and reservoirs or other works of a similar nature; or measures taken with the object of re-afforestation and the management of forests.

IX. Subject to the provisions of Articles XV and XVI of the Mandate for Palestine, of Articles VIII and X of the Mandate for Mesopotamia, and of Article VIII of the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, and subject also to the general right of control in relation to education and public instruction, of the local Administrations concerned, the British and French Governments agree to allow the schools which French and British nationals possess and direct at the present moment in their respective Mandatory areas to continue their work freely; the teaching of French and English will be freely permitted in these schools.

The present article does not in any way imply the right of nationals of either of the two parties to open new schools in the Mandatory area of the other.

The present Convention has been drawn up in English and French, each of the two texts having equal force.

Secret

Done at Paris, the 23rd December, 1920, in a double copy, one of which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and the other in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

(L.S.) HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

(L.S.) G. LEYGUES.

Secret

Appendix C

Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, 20 July 1949.

328

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

No. 657. ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREE-MENT. SIGNED AT HILL 232, NEAR MAHANAYIM, ON 20 JULY 1949

Preamble

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948,² calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negociate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations Chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

- 1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties. The establishment of an armistice between their armed forces is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.
- 2. No aggressive action by the armed forces—land, sea or air—of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned

¹Came into force on 20 July 1949, as from the date of signature, in accordance with article VIII (1).

²United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 126 (381st meeting), page 53.

330

United Nations — Treaty Series

1949

in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

- 1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.
- 2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military, and not by political, considerations.

Article III

- 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties—land, sea and air—is hereby established.
- 2. No element of the land, sea or air, military or para-military, forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in article V of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party.
- 3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party or against civilians in territory under control of that Party.

Article IV

1. The line described in article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.

No. 657

1949

- 2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.
- 3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement, with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of that article.

Article V

- 1. It is emphasized that the following arrangements for the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the Demilitarized Zone are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two Parties to this Agreement.
- 2. In pursuance of the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone have been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two Parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.
- 3. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on the map attached to this Agreement as annex I. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow a line midway between the existing truce lines, as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for the Israeli and Syrian forces. Where the existing truce lines run along the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the boundary line.
- 4. The armed forces of the two Parties shall nowhere advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line.
- 5. (a) Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the Parties, shall be established as a Demilitarized Zone from which the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no activities by military or para-military forces shall be permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors which shall form part of the Demilitarized Zone.

No. 657

334

1949

- (b) Any advance by the armed forces, military or para-military, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarized Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.
- (c) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Argeement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.
- (d) The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the Demilitarized Zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this Agreement (annex II).
- (e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of this article.
- 6. On each side of the Demilitarized Zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex III to this Agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex IV to this Agreement.

Article VI

All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows:

- 1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at the site of the Armistice Conference within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.
- 2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.
- 3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

No. 657

1949

- 4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.¹
- 5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Article VII

- 1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.
- 2. The Mixed Armistice Commission, shall maintain its headquarters at the Customs House near Jisr Banat Ya'qub and at Mahanayim, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.
- 3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.
- 4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.
- 5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

No. 657

League of Nations, Treaty Series, Volume CXVIII, page 303; Volume CXXII, page 367; Volume CXXVI, page 460; Volume CXXX, page 468; Volume CXXXIV, page 431; Volume CXXXVIII, page 452; Volume CXLII, page 376; Volume CXLVII, page 351; Volume CLVI, page 229; Volume CLX, page 383; Volume CLXIV, page 388; Volume CLXXII, page 413; Volume CLXXVII, page 407; Volume CLXXXI, page 393; Volume CXCIII, page 270; Volume CXCVI, page 417; Volume CXCVII, page 316; Volume CC, page 511; Volume CCIV, page 448; and United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 31, page 497.

1949

- 6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.
- 7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.
- 8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and article I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.
- 9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.
- 10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.
- 11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article VIII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

No. 657

340

1949

- 2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.
- 3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. Participation in such conferences shall be obligatory upon the Parties.
- 4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought, on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.
- 5. This Agreement, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, is signed in quintuplicate. One copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

Done at Hill 232 near Mahanayim on the twentieth of July nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the personal deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

For and on behalf of the Israeli Government:

(Signed)
Lieutenant-Colonel Mordechai
MAKLEFF
Yehoshua PELMAN
Shabtai ROSENNE

For and on behalf of the Syrian Government:

(Signed)
Colonel Fozi Selo
Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Nasser
Captain Afif Sizri

No. 657

Appendix D

United Nations. Security Council Resolutions No. 234 of 7 June 1967 and No. 235 of 9 June 1967 (Demarcation of cease-fire lines reported separately in Document 5/7930/add.18-41).

Resolution No. 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967

DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East [resolution 233 (1967)], military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area.

- 1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

 Adopted unanimously at the 1350th meeting.

Resolution No. 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967

Noting the acceptance of the cease-fire by Israel and Syria and demanding that hostilities should cease forthwith

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

- 1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;
 - 2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

Adopted unanimously at the 1352nd meeting.

Secret

Appendix E

United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967.

Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967

STATING THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

- 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied* in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
 - 2. Affirms further the necessity
- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Appendix F

United Nations. Security Council Resolution No. 338 of 22 October 1973.

Resolution No. 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973

Calling for a cease-fire and for the implementation of Resolution 242 in all of its parts

The Security Council,

- 1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
- 2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
- 3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted at the 1747th meeting:*

In favour: 14
Against: —

Appendix G

Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, Israel and Syria, 31 May 1974.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES SIGNED 31 MAY, 1974

- A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated 22 October, 1973.
- B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:
 - 1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1. [Editorial note: See fig. 14, ch. 5.]
 - 2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.
 - 3. The area between Line A and the Line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.
 - 4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
 - 5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.
 - 6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.
- C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.
- D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than 31 May, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group who will agree on the stages of this process. The military working group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the military working group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.
- E. Provisions of paragraphs A, B, and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.
- F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the military working group, all remaining prisoners will be repatriated.
- G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within 10 days after the signing of this agreement.
- H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated 22 October, 1973

PROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

Israel and Syria agree that:

The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The UNDOF will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the authority of the Security Council.

The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a regular basis, not less often than once every fifteen days, and, in addition, when requested by either party. It shall mark on the site the respective lines shown on the map attached to the agreement.

Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the United Nations Security Council which will provide for the UNDOF contemplated by the agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.

Appendix H

Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978.

Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978 A. Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Text of Agreements Signed September 17, 1978

A PRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

-The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its

neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neigh-

borly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority

to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the

inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

 Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

- 3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
- 4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
- 2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
- 3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be desit with by this committee.
- 4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

- 1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three

months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

- Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
- 2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
 - (a) full recognition;
 - (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
- Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
- Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
- 5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
- 6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure re-

spect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab

For the Government of Israel:

of the Arab of 1sr Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

Secret	Approved For Release 2009/02/12 : CIA-RDP83B00851R000400150002-5				
					e e
					Į.
	•				
					ą
					. 4 3:

